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Understanding the Rise of Far-Right 
Populist Parties in Europe
Alina L. Sobolik
University of Victoria
Abstract
 This paper seeks to answer the question: what drives the recent electoral success of 
far-right populist parties (RPPs) in Europe? I will argue that it is supply factors, rather than 
demand factors, united under the theme of mistrust, that drove the recent electoral success 
of RPPs. To support my argument, I will summarize the ‘losers of globalization’ theory and 
apply it to the financial and economic crises, the migration crisis, the polarization of politics, 
and mistrust in governments, and categorize them as supply or demand factors according to 
Matt Golder’s definitions. For the sake of this paper, I will use a broad description of RPPs: 
any party that appeals primarily to the middle class while intentionally ‘othering’ the elite 
and immigrants. ‘Othering,’ in this sense, refers to the process of alienating or excluding a 
group from society, creating a dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them.’
Keywords
 populism, far-right, immigration, mistrust
Understanding the Rise of Far-Right Populist Parties
1 0 0 Alina L. Sobolik University of Victoria
1. Introduction
 The sudden rise of right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in Europe over the last 10 
years has been a daunting question for political scientists, economists, citizens, workers, and 
politicians. This paper seeks to answer the question: what drives the recent electoral success 
of RPPs in Europe? I will argue that it is supply factors that drove the recent electoral suc-
cess of RPPs, all of which are united under the critical theme of mistrust. To support my 
argument, I will summarize the ‘losers of globalization’ theory and apply it to the financial 
and economic crises, the migration crisis, the polarization of politics, and the mismanage-
ment by governments, and categorize them as supply or demand factors. “Demand-side 
explanations focus on the grievances that create the ‘demand’ for far-right parties, whereas 
supply-side explanations focus on how the choices that far-right parties make and the politi-
cal opportunity structure in which they act influence their success” (Golder, 2016, p. 1). 
 A lack of trust in national governments is dangerous because it magnifies fear of 
global trends, leaving citizens concerned that their governments are acting in the interest 
of foreign actors. This fear is the supply factor that leads the electorate to be vulnerable to 
the inflammatory tactics of right-wing populist parties, which present a clear plan of action 
for defending the nation. For the sake of this paper, I will be using a broad description of 
right-wing populist parties (RPPs): any party that appeals primarily to the middle class while 
intentionally ‘othering’ the elite and immigrants. ‘Othering,’ in this sense, refers to the 
process of alienating or excluding a group from society, often placing them in the position 
of ‘scape goat’ or ‘enemy.’ By their very nature, populist parties challenge the structure of 
established governance and introduce an informal, anti-bureaucratic sentiment. I will show 
that a combination of the economic and financial crises, the migration crisis, and the behav-
iour of governments resulted in a political space for RPPs to step in and fill a leadership role 
that could have been filled by left or centrist governments, rather than driving sentiments 
compatible with RPPs.
2. RPP Major Successes and Failures
 In recent years we have seen a dramatic rise in RPPs throughout Europe. In Po-
land, the Law and Justice Party, headed by President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister 
Beata Szydło, won 37.6% of the votes in 2015, giving them an absolute majority (Poll of 
Polls, 2018a). Support for the Law and Justice Party is not likely to decline, considering that 
they are projected to win 40% of the vote in the next election (Poll of Polls, 2018a). The 
Swiss People’s Party headed by Albert Rösti achieved 29.4% of the vote in 2015, making 
them the largest party in Switzerland (Poll of Polls, 2018b). Their popularity increased as 
they are expected to gain 31% of the vote in the 2019 elections (Poll of Polls, 2018b). In 
Italy we have a coalition government made up of the Italian Northern League (17.37%) 
and the Five Star Movement (32.66%) (Poll of Polls, 2018c). The 2018 election showed a 
7.1% vote increase for the Italian Northern League and a 13.28% increase for the Five Star 
Movement (Poll of Polls, 2018c). In the upcoming elections, the League is projected to win 
25% of the vote and the Five Star Movement is projected to win 31% (Poll of Polls, 2018c). 
This would make them the first and second largest political parties. 
 The Hungarian Civic Alliance, more commonly known as the Fidesz, headed by 
Viktor Orbán, was able to win 49.27% of the vote in 2018, achieving their third successful 
election (Poll of Polls, 2018d). They are expected to win 55% in the next election, giving 
them a total majority (Poll of Polls, 2018d). Jobbik, the Movement For a Better Hungary (a 
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more radical right-wing party in Hungary), won 19.06% in the 2018 election, making them 
the second largest party (Poll of Polls, 2018d ). The Danish People’s Party in Denmark won 
21.1% in the 2015 elections, making it the second largest party (only 5.2% less than the larg-
est party) (Poll of Polls, 2018e). Interestingly, they are currently projected to lose 3.1% of 
their support in the next election (Poll of Polls, 2018e). The Swedish Democrats went from 
7.3% in the 2010 elections to 12.9% in the 2014 elections and are currently projected to win 
21% in the next election (Poll of Polls, 2018f). For context, the Moderate Party is projected 
to win 21% and the Swedish Social Democratic Party is projected to win 25% of the votes, 
making the Swedish Democrats the second or third largest party, and not far from first (Poll 
of Polls, 2018f). The Party for Freedom in the Netherlands won 20% in the last election, 
making it the second largest party after the Peoples Party For Freedom and Democracy at 
33% (Poll of Polls, 2018g). However, they are projected to win only 14% in the next one, 
putting them behind the Green Left (Poll of Polls, 2018g).
 The Freedom Party for Austria won 25.97% of the votes in the 2017 elections, an 
increase of 5.46% from the last election, placing them as the third largest party (Poll of Polls, 
2018h). The True Finns, or the Finns Party, has become the third largest party in Finland, 
winning 17.7% of the vote in the 2015 elections (Poll of Polls, 2018i). Support is suspected 
to drop to 8% in the next election, likely because the party has since split, with a portion of 
its members forming the Blue Reform Party (Poll of Polls, 2018i). The Finns Party is cur-
rently the third largest party. The National Rally, formerly known as the National Front, 
lead by Marine Le Pen, currently holds third place in France with 13.2% of the vote (Poll of 
Polls, 2018j). This is 0.4% less than they earned in the 2012 election (Poll of Polls, 2018j). 
However, support is growing and they are projected to take 15% in the next election (Poll 
of Polls, 2018j). The Alternative for Germany party is currently the third largest party in the 
Bundestag with 12.6% in the 2017 elections and they are projected to take 14% of the vote 
in the next election (Poll of Polls, 2018k). 
 The Slovakian People’s Party, who refer to gypsy people as “extremists” and “par-
asites” (Kotleba, 2018), gained 8% of the vote in the 2016 election and are projected to win 
10% in the next one (Poll of Polls, 2018l). This would make them the third largest party. In 
the Czech Republic, the Freedom and Direct Democracy Party won 10.64% of the vote in 
the 2017 elections and are projected to win 9% in the next elections (Poll of Polls, 2018m). 
In Greece, the Golden Dawn gained only 7% in 2015, placing them third and far behind 
the second largest party (New Democracy at 28.1%) and they are projected to gain only 1 or 
2% in the next election (Poll of Polls, 2018n). The success of various RPPs across Europe, 
each with unique rhetoric and policy platforms, shows a general trend that is not based on 
any specific policy agenda, but rather general sentiments of national populism.
3. The Financial and Economic Crises
 Right-wing populist, neo-Nazi, racist, anti-immigrant, and/or Eurosceptic parties 
have always existed. It is only recently that they are winning elections and experiencing high 
levels of support. There are outside, contemporary forces driving the success of racist and 
radical parties. The ‘losers of globalization’ is a leading theory that offers an explanation for 
the success of RPPs and can be understood as a demand or supply factor (Becker, 2010). 
The demand argument is that those who support the right wing populist movement were 
endowed with right-wing views already and have only now been given a voice to express 
them (Cutts, David, Ford, & Goodwin, 2009). The other, a supply argument, claims that 
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through globalization, job insecurity, and mistrust in governments, the citizens were left 
vulnerable to RPP campaigns. Citizens were left vulnerable to RPPs because the Left and 
Center groups that traditionally formed to represent the workers, or the lower and middle 
class, have embraced ideas of globalism and globalization, participating in free trade agree-
ments and supranational governance through the EU. The Left has developed a platform 
that equates progressivism with cosmopolitanism, leaving a vacuum for RPPs to fill where 
the Left used to represent the working class. The RPPs are seen as the only parties pushing 
for protectionism and articulating the interests of the working class as their top priority.
 By creating job insecurity, the financial and economic crises were beneficial to 
RPPs. For example, in Hungary between 2006 and 2010, real wages and earnings decreased 
by 5%, unemployment increased by 10%, inflation increased by 10%, and the share of 
the vote for the Hungarian Social Party dropped by 22.3% (Cutts et. al., 2009, p. 32-34). 
However, this cannot be the sole explanation nor can it be the most convincing, as some 
countries that were hit the hardest by the crises (Greece) did not see a significant rise in 
support for RPPs (European Social Survey, 2016). Surveys have shown that people are 
unsure about their financial situation (European Social Survey, 2016). They are more likely 
to think that it will remain the same rather than become better, and in some cases are al-
most as likely to think it will be worse than better (European Social Survey, 2016, p. 158). 
Confidence in national economies is decreasing and citizens are growing more concerned 
and restless. According to a European Social Survey, people who are unemployed, receive 
lower income, and/or have a lower level of education, are more likely to vote against im-
migration (European Social Survey, 2016, p. 9). Demographics that feel insecure about their 
job and financial future are more likely to feel threatened by a potential foreign labour force. 
However, the fact that they also feel that immigrants will improve quality of life in every 
area aside from cultural also shows that the concern is based mainly in misinformation and 
the presentation of immigrants by RPPs as a cultural threat (European Social Survey, 2016, 
p. 8). I argue that the financial and economic crises contribute to supply rather than demand 
forces, because those who suffer the effects of the crises do not necessarily turn to RPPs or 
anti-immigrant sentiments and remain open to conceptualising immigration as beneficial. 
However, RPPs are able to foster feelings of insecurity created by the crises in order to push 
their anti-immigrant agenda.
4. The Migration Crisis
 This leads me to the next possible contributing factor: the migration crisis. The mi-
gration crisis can be framed as a demand factor, with an increase in immigration resulting in 
an increase of anti-immigrant sentiments, which translate to support for RPPs. Overall, EU 
citizens do not feel positively about immigration from outside the EU (European Commis-
sion, 2017a, p. 51). Negative feelings about immigrants have increased in 13 member states 
since spring 2017 (European Commission, 2017a, p. 46). However, one of those member 
states is Greece, with an increase of 4% (total 76%), and Greece has not experienced high 
levels of support for RPPs (European Commission, 2017a, p. 46). The migration crisis does 
not serve as an effective basis for a demand argument because, with Greece as an example, 
the statistics show that negative opinions on immigrants do not necessarily translate to votes 
for RPPs. Overall, 56% of EU citizens feel negatively about immigration from outside the 
EU but right-wing populist parties are not getting 56% of the vote in the EU (European 
Commission, 2016, p. 22). Rather, I argue that the migration crisis serves as a supply factor, 
https://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2019/iss1/8
Claremont–UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 1 0 3
due to the way that it is presented as an issue that is out of the control of current govern-
ments. It is a highly publicized phenomenon, surrounded by a rhetoric of chaos and uncer-
tainty, leaving a political space for RPPs to join the conversation by offering a solution, no 
matter how radical. The fact that left-wing and centrist governments have failed to provide 
a concrete and unified response, due to conflicting obligations to European integration, 
solidarity, human rights, and public opinion, contributes to the impact of RPPs on the 
electorate.
5. Inflammatory Tactics
 This is where the RPPs contribute as a supply factor. The RPPs have successfully 
fostered a “culture of resentment” toward the government and immigrants (Becker, 2010, 
p. 31). They consolidate power by appealing to the irrational fear, hatred, and emotion 
in people. Historically, the left and right alike have done this under a common theme of 
blinding the people (Becker, 2010). The tactics being used today are similar to those used 
in the populist movements of the past. The right has created a narrative around immigrants 
and leftists that is similar to that surrounding the Jews and Communists in the 20th century 
(and in many cases they are still involved today). The Left has fashioned a similar narrative 
around the far-right, branding them as extremists and outcasts whose ideas are poisonous to 
society. This dynamic has created a political atmosphere in which both sides refuse to find 
common ground on important issues, and the ‘loudest’ party is able to draw the attention 
of the electorate. The fact that the people who vote for RPPs were often past supporters 
of socialist and left wing parties shows that they are more likely to have been vulnerable to 
right-wing populist movements than opponents of them (Becker, 2010). The right benefits 
from this polarization by inciting chaos and then offering a ‘path to order.’
 When the real statistics on immigration in Europe are considered, it is clear that the 
severity of the threat has been overstated. I will ask you to focus on the immigrants born in 
a non-member country because they are the main targets of discrimination by RPPs.
Understanding the Rise of Far-Right Populist Parties
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Figure. 1. Foreign Born Population by Country of Birth, 2017. 
Graph from Eurostat (January 2017).
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 It is difficult to understand how such a small portion of the population could pose 
a serious cultural threat. Especially when considering countries such as Slovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, and the Czech Republic, who have very low proportions of immigrants yet also 
successful RPPs. The far sides of the spectrum are growing and the center is shrinking. 
There are more people who believe many immigrants should be allowed to enter and more 
who believe that no immigrants should be allowed to enter (Richards, 2016). 
 It is easy for the radical right to appeal to those who are unhappy with their current 
situation by preaching ‘anti-establishment’ rejection of the ‘political norm’ and support for 
the individual (Betz, 1994). As further argued by Betz (1994), they do this by describing a 
superior common sense over the intellectual and prescribing a ‘new way’ that will improve 
the individual’s situation. With the rise of the internet/online politics, specialized media has 
become popular, appealing to people’s individual beliefs and values and allowing them to 
subscribe to a body of media that caters only to their prefixed views. This marks a decline 
in cleavage politics and creates a new kind of fragmentation that focuses on a political niche 
and creates many small and radical groups, pulling the entire spectrum away from the center. 
Rather than gravitating toward one side of an issue, the voters are drawn to a specific issue 
or body of issues and a political doctrine that surrounds them. This process has nourished a 
“culture of discontent” that was not properly managed by the ruling political powers. This 
polarization contributed to supply factors, by leaving a gap for radical right-wing parties to 
offer an answer and monopolize on the call for a new order (Betz, 1994). 
6. Mistrust in Governments
 My fourth and final supply side argument is mistrust in national governments. 
This is how RPPs have been able to use the migration crisis to gather support (Villa, 2018). 
Standard Eurobarometer surveys have shown that since 2004, citizens’ trust in the EU and 
in their national governments have significantly decreased, as illustrated in Figure 2 below 
(European Commission, 2011). 
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Figure 2. Trust in the national government, the national parliament, and the European Union: 
Trend, 2004-2011. Graph from European Commission (2011).
 This lack of trust in national governments has left citizens feeling vulnerable and 
looking for a strong leader who articulates a ‘plan of action’ with the peoples’ interests 
at the helm. This is what populist parties offer. In order to combat this effect, member 
state governments must maintain transparency on all issues, including migration and their 
relationship with the EU. Over the past years, public dissatisfaction with the functioning 
of democracy has been growing (Goodwin, 2011). If it is the ‘losers of globalization’ that 
want RPPs in power, they still do not want a reversal of globalization or free trade, they 
simply want to feel that their government can be trusted to protect their interests. While 
many people have negative views about globalization, they also have negative views about 
protectionism and positive views about free trade (European Commission, 2017b, p. 144). 
Immigration is concerning to them because they are uncertain of what it means for their 
future and way of life, not because it is inherently problematic. They do not want to close 
themselves off to the world but they want their jobs and quality of life to be maintained. 
Many national governments have been hesitant in the past to share sovereignty with the EU 
on issues like migration and they have been concerned about presenting an image of weak-
ness to their citizens. However, a minority of citizens trust in their national governments, 
and citizens are more likely to trust the European Union than their national governments 
(European Commission, 2017b, p. 147).
 
7. Conclusion
 The validity of the ‘losers of globalization’ theory lies in its emphasis on feelings of 
vulnerability experienced by citizens in a globalized world, allowing global trends to have 
an impact on the electorate for this reason. However, I argue that rather than driving senti-
ments compatible with RPPs, this results in a political space for RPPs to step in and take 
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leadership roles that could have been filled by left-wing or centrist parties. RPPs have been 
able to rise to power by offering a concrete strategy for change and for the future, allowing 
the people to place trust in them. A lack of transparency, coupled with scape-goating of the 
European Union, has left citizens distrustful of their national governments, which renders 
them vulnerable to inflammatory campaign tactics framing modernization and immigration 
as a threat. The supply is not meeting the demand. People are not driven by racism, but 
mistrust and insecurity. RPPs are doing what the left is failing to do: offering an answer to 
their concerns, a rode map to success.
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